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Abstract
Workers can have good or bad work habits. These traits are transmitted from one
generation to the next through a learning and imitation process which depends on
parents’ investment on the trait and the social environment where children live. We
show that, if a high enough proportion of employers have taste-based prejudices against
minority workers, their prejudices are always self-fulﬁlled in steady state. Aﬃrmative
Action improves the welfare of minorities whereas integration is beneﬁcial to minority
workers but detrimental to workers from the majority group. If Aﬃrmative Action
quotas are high enough or integration is strong enough, employers’ negative stereotypes
cannot be sustained in steady-state.
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11 Introduction
According to a survey conducted in Chicago in 1988, one of the main reasons employers are
not willing to hire inner-city black workers is the lack of basic skills and work ethics. As
a suburban employer in Chicago put it, “The experiences that I’ve run into with it is that
they develop bad habits, I guess is the best way to put it. Not showing up to work on time.
Not showing up to work. Somewhere down the road they didn’t develop good work habits.”1
This is consistent with more general evidence from sociology and anthropology2 suggest-
ing the existence of a persistent “ghetto culture”, which is transmitted across generations.
The existence of a low work ethic has been pointed out by several scholars as an important
element in the set of values deﬁning the prevalent culture in inner-city neighborhoods. These
values are in sharp contrast with mainstream American society’s working values rooted in
the Protestant tradition. As argued by Wilson, it is the social, rather than the physical
distance, that often separates poor workers from good jobs. This is particularly true for the
African American community, which has experienced high levels of segregation for at least
a century (Massey and Denton, 1993, Cutler et al., 1999).
“Inner-city social isolation also generates behavior not conducive to good work
histories. The patterns of behavior that are associated with a life of casual work
(tardiness and absenteeism) are quite diﬀerent from those that accompany a life of
regular or steady work (e.g. the habit of waking up early in the morning to a ringing
alarm clock). ... in neighborhoods in which most families do not have a steadily
employed breadwinner, the norms and behavior patterns associated with steady work
compete with those associated with casual or infrequent work.” (Wilson, 1996)
In the words of a counsellor to a training program aiming at exposing workers to more
conventional working values:
“To adopt a regular pattern you have to break with this environment. Your friends
laugh at you for going to work, that’s hell, they think you are trying to be better than
them! You have to have strong character to resist this pressure. If all your friends and
1See Wilson (1996) pages 119-120. Italics are ours.
2See, in particular, Hannerz (1969), Lewis, (1969), Wilson (1987), Lemman (1991) and Katz (1993).
2families went to work they would help you adopt a regular schedule.” (cited in Bonney,
1975)3
Why do some groups perform worse in the labor market than others? Several explanations
have been put forward in the economics literature. In taste-based models (Becker, 1957),
discrimination originates from employers’ willingness to reduce proﬁts to avoid hiring workers
they are prejudiced against. Those workers will only be hired at lower salaries. The statistical
discrimination theory, on the other hand, stresses the role of employers’ beliefs concerning
the average quality of workers from diﬀerent groups. A member of the disadvantaged group
will be discriminated against if the employer believes she is less qualiﬁed or reliable than a
worker from other groups (see, e.g. Phelps, 1972, Arrow, 1973, Coate and Loury, 1993). In
these models, negative stereotypes are self-fulﬁlling since discriminated workers become less
productive as a result of the negative expectations held by the employers. More recently,
it has been argued that the existence of community (or peer) eﬀects can explain the poor
performance of some workers. In absence of interaction between communities, some groups,
due to interaction with poorly performing peers, end up with lower levels of education and
adverse labor market outcomes (see, e.g. Arnott and Rowse, 1987, De Bartoleme, 1990, and
Benabou, 1993).4
Other aspects, like work habits,5 can also explained the diﬀerent performances between
workers from diﬀerent communities. These traits, which aﬀect individual performance in the
workplace, are inﬂuenced by parents and peers.6 Evidence from the sociological literature
suggests that children’s families and the communities where they live are important elements
in shaping their attitudes towards work. Employers are reluctant to hire some workers
because the prevalent values in their communities may negatively aﬀect the incentives of
3This is related to the idea of “acting white” where economic success of blacks induces peers’ rejection
(Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005)
4For a general overview of the issue of race in the labor market, see Altonji and Blank (1999) and Lundberg
and Startz (2000).
5“Work habit” can be measured by a person’s willingness to be unemployed, collect welfare, avoid shirking,
or work long hours.
6Mulligan (1996) shows that a child of parents who do not work and/or collect government beneﬁts for not
working displays a tendency to behave similarly as an adult. Kohn (1969) concludes that parents generalize
their experiences on the job and pass them to their children. More recently, Osborne Groves (2005) suggest
that intergenerational transmission of personality may be a channel to explain intergenerational persistence
of income.
3parents to transmit the right habits. Policies promoting integration may, on the contrary,
have a positive eﬀect via parents investments.
We model the formation of “work-habit” traits using a mechanism that interacts pur-
poseful socialization decisions inside the family (direct vertical socialization) and indirect
socialization processes via peer eﬀects and social interactions (oblique and horizontal social-
ization). Indeed, based on some works on anthropology and sociology (see in particular Boyd
and Richerson, 1985, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981), there is a recent literature initiated
by the seminal papers of Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001)7 arguing that the transmission of
a particular trait (religion, ethnicity, social status, etc.) is the outcome of a socialization
inside and outside the family (like e.g. peers and role models). These two types of socializa-
tion are cultural substitutes (complements) if parents have less (more) incentive to socialize
their children the more widely dominant their values are in the population.8 In our model,
we assume that parents are forward looking and invest resources in order to prepare their
children for their future working experiences. Parents’ eﬀorts and children’s preferences are
also aﬀected by the environment where children interact.
Workers belong either the majority group or the minority group. All individuals are
born equal but, depending on the parents’ investments and the social environment where
they live, they acquire either a good (g) or a bad (b) work habit (absenteeism, tardiness, low
reliability...). When deciding how much eﬀort to exert on shaping their children’s attitudes
towards work, parents must form expectations about the working opportunities their children
are going to face in the future.
We assume that each worker is randomly matched to an employer who has to assign the
worker to a job. Employers know the group a worker belongs to but cannot perfectly observe
her type. A proportion of employers may be taste-based prejudiced against minority workers
and do not want to employ them. All other employers (imperfectly) screen the workers and
employ them if they seem to have good working habits. This second group of employers are
proﬁt maximizers. The diﬀerent treatment the workers are subject to creates a discrepancy
in expected value in the market of the good trait for the two groups.
We ﬁrst focus on a segregated society and show that, if the fraction of prejudiced em-
7Bisin and Verdier (2011) provide a very complete overview of this literature.
8Bisin et al. (2004), Cohen Zada (2006), Jellal and Wolﬀ (2002), and Patacchini and Zenou (2011)
provide empirical studies of cultural transmission and socialization of, respectively, religious traits, altruism,
and preferences for education.
4ployers is high enough and the peer group bad enough, their beliefs are self-fulﬁlled. Indeed,
in steady-state, all minority workers end up with bad work habits and the proﬁt maximizing
strategy is not to employ them. Due to the adverse opportunities their children are going
to face, parents do not ﬁnd worthwhile exerting eﬀort to transmit “good” values. As a
result, more workers have bad work habits. This, in turn, inﬂuences members of the next
generations in the same community and the initial negative beliefs are conﬁrmed in steady
state.
We then study the eﬀect of diﬀerent policies aiming at weakening this “ghetto” culture,
which perpetuates bad working habits.
We ﬁrst analyze Aﬃrmative Action programs consisting in (i) imposing a quota of the
discriminated group in good jobs, (ii) a quota of workers of the discriminated group who
are treated as the workers of the other group. Under certain conditions, we show that the
ﬁrst policy has a negative long run eﬀect while the second does improve the welfare. If
the Aﬃrmative Action imposes high enough quotas, negative beliefs cannot be sustained in
steady state and all workers develop better work habits.
We then analyze the eﬀect of integration policies. In this case, children are to some
degree inﬂuenced by peers from both groups. We show that integration is beneﬁcial for the
workers who come from the worst peer group and detrimental for the others. This result
helps us to understand why the latter may have an incentive to resist integration and may
be reluctant to accept social mixing.
2 Related literature
Our model is related to the literature on statistical discrimination and cultural transmission
since it combines elements of both literatures. However, there are important diﬀerences
that we would like to highlight. First, compared to the statistical discrimination literature
(especially Coate and Loury, 1993), in our model, there is no statistical discrimination,
only racial discrimination a la Becker (1957). As a result, the mechanisms that drive the
results are very diﬀerent. In Coate and Loury (1993), minority workers do not invest enough
in human capital because employers do not value their performance at their “real” value
since they statistically discriminate them. On the contrary, in our model, it is the parents’
expectation that plays a crucial role since they will put eﬀort in “educating” their kids if
5they believe that the future income of their oﬀsprings will be high enough. As a complement
or a substitute, the quality of the neighborhood and thus of the peers also play a decisive role
on kids’ future outcomes because they inﬂuence the possibility to have a good or bad work
habit. Observe also that our model is dynamic while that of Coate and Loury (and most
of the statistical discrimination literature) is static. Introducing dynamics in their model
will lead ﬁrms to discover the real value of workers’ productivity and thus, in the long run,
statistical discrimination as well as employment and wage diﬀerences between minority and
majority workers would disappear. This is not what we observe in the real world. On the
contrary, in our model, the outcomes diﬀerences persist in the long run because of parents’
diﬀerent expectations and diﬀerent neighborhood quality. Second, even though we use the
cultural transmission model of Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), there are diﬀerences between
our model and theirs. First, in their model, each parent value her own trait most, which
makes sense in the context of religion, for example. Catholic parents prefer their children to
be catholic rather than another religion, Muslim parents prefer their children to be Muslim,
etc. In our model, this is not true anymore. All parents value the same trait most, that is the
trait “good work habit”. In other words, parents with bad work habits will still try to put
some eﬀort for their children to adopt the good work habit trait. This is has very important
consequence for the steady-state equilibrium analysis. If one keeps the assumption of Bisin
and Verdier (which does not make much sense in our context), then it has to be that, at any
steady-state equilibrium, all parents (with good or bad work habits) will provide exactly the
same socialization eﬀort. This is, of course, not true anymore in our model since, in general,
parents with good work habits tend to put more eﬀort in transmitting the trait “good work
habit” than those who have bad work habits. Second, we introduce frequency-dependent
bias meeting process while, in the standard framework of Bisin and Verdier, it is an unbiased
meeting process. In other words, if the socialization decision inside the family (direct vertical
socialization) does not work then kids are inﬂuenced by an indirect socialization processes
via peer eﬀects and social interactions (oblique and horizontal socialization), which, in the
unbiased case, means that the chance to adopt a trait is just equal to the fraction of people
living in the neighborhood having that trait (random matching). This is in fact a particular
case of our model. We consider a more general framework where the probability of adopting
a certain trait can be increasing or decreasing with the fraction of people having the trait in
the neighborhood. This is has also important consequences for the dynamics of the model.
6If, for example, there were no income gain in having good work habits, with an unbiased
meeting process, any value of q (i.e. the fraction of individuals having the “good” trait)
could be a steady-state equilibrium while, with a frequency-dependent bias meeting process,
only two stable equilibria emerge, either q∗ = 0 or q∗ = 1.
Our model is also related to a recent literature that investigates the eﬀects of culture on
labor outcomes. Focusing on Switzerland, Brügger et al. (2009) study how unemployment
is aﬀected by diﬀerences in culturally determined attitudes towards work within a narrowly
deﬁned geographic area. Their ﬁndings indicate that diﬀerences in culture explain diﬀerences
in unemployment duration on the order of 20 percent. Algan and Cahuc (2005) and Alesina
and Giuliano (2010) also investigate the role of “family culture” on labor market outcomes.
These studies ﬁnd that strong family ties reduce labor force participation. Ichino and Maggi
(2000) study cultural diﬀerences in the propensity to shirk (absenteeism and misconduct)
using data from a large Italian bank. They also ﬁnd strong eﬀects.9 Other empirical studies
have looked at the role of culture in explaining how social norms aﬀect unemployment out-
comes. Stutzer and Lalive (2004) use a novel measure of social norm to work: The percentage
of citizens in a community who voted in favor of a reduction of unemployment beneﬁts in
a Swiss referendum. They ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase in the strength of
the social work norm translates, on average, into a reduction of unemployment duration
by approximately eleven days. Using British data, Clark (2003) ﬁnds similar results: The
unemployed’s well-being is shown to be strongly positively correlated with reference group
unemployment (at the regional, partner, or household level).10
Our main contribution to this literature is to propose a dynamic model that combines
discrimination and cultural transmission that can explain why some (inner-city) neighbor-
hoods are populated by people having bad working habits (the “ghetto culture” mentioned
in the Introduction). In our framework, it is the result of a combination of discrimination,
low investment in work ethic from parents and bad peers. We are also able to study two dif-
ferent policies, namely Aﬃrmative Action and integration policy, and show how they aﬀect
the long-run outcomes of minority as well as majority workers.
9See Guiso et al. (2006) for an overview of this literature and an interesting discussion on how culture
aﬀects outcomes.
10There are also theoretical models studying the inpact of social norms on labor-market outcomes (Kolm
2005), crime (Glaeser et al., 1996; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012), and welfare state provisions (Lindbeck et
al., 1999, 2003; Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006).
73 The model
There is a continuum of workers who belong either to majority group (k = M) or to the
minority group (k = m). Apart from an observable trait (for example the color of their skin),
majority and minority workers are totally identical. There is also an unobservable trait that
determines their behavior on the job. In particular, we assume that workers have either a
“good” (g) or “bad” (b) work habit and are referred to as “good” and “bad” workers.
The employer can observe the group the worker belongs to (majority or minority) but
not her type (“good” or “bad”). At each time t (−∞ < t < ∞), every active worker is
randomly matched with an employer. The employer decides whether or not to hire this
worker. If a worker of type i (i = b,g) is hired, the payoﬀ to the principal is Πi, whatever
the group k = m,M she belongs to. The payoﬀ is 0 if the worker is not hired. We assume
that Πg > 0 > Πb. Irrespective of their type, workers earn a wage w > 0 when hired and
zero when unemployed.11
As stated in the introduction, we study the intergenerational transmission of work-habit
traits using an overlapping generation model. The way this trait is transmitted is through an
education and peer-imitation process that depends on parents’ investment on the trait and
the social environment where children live. The transmission of the trait is here modeled
as a mechanism that interacts socialization inside the family (vertical socialization) with
socialization outside the family (oblique socialization) via imitation and learning from peers
and role models as in Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001).
Children preferences are shaped, via education, by their parents since they care about
their children’s future wellbeing. We analyze the behavior of a group and assume ﬁrst that
children only meet peers from the same group (i.e. segregation).12 We assume that teaching
good work ethics is costly and that a parent chooses an education eﬀort, τ, possibly zero,
so that with a probability equal to the education eﬀort, education will be successful and the
child will have a good work ethic. Otherwise, the child remains naive, without the working
trait, and is matched to a group of peers from which she learns and adopts the good trait
with probability f(q), where q is the proportion of “good” workers in the peer group. Let p
be the probability that a child is socialized to trait g. Since there is continuum of agents, by
the Law of Large Numbers, p also denotes the fraction of children who become g. We have
11Without loss of generality, we normalize the unemployment beneﬁt to zero.
12In Section 4.2, we investigate the case of integration between minority and majority workers.
8the following transition probability:
p = τ + (1 − τ)f(q) (1)
The child will have a good work habit if her parent’s education is successful (with probability
τ) or if the parent is unsuccessful (this happens with probability 1 −τ) and she learns from
“good” peers. Observe that f(q) captures the process of oblique transmission by which the
naive child is inﬂuenced by her peers.
We assume that the transmission function f(q) is frequency dependent, namely naive
children copy with disproportionately high probability the most common trait in society.
This learning process may be the result of children evaluating the merit of the diﬀerent
working habits by its frequency in the population (see Sáez-Martí and Sjögren, 2008, for
microfoundations). Formally, the oblique transmission function f : [0,1] → [0,1] is a twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing function with f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1, and with at most
one ￿ q ∈ (0,1) such that f(￿ q) = ￿ q.
Three qualitatively diﬀerent biases are discussed in the sociobiological literature (Boyd
and Richerson, 1985):
(a) Positive bias: the probability that the naïve individual acquires the good work habit
from her peers is always greater than if he had copied one role model at random, f(q) > q
for all q ∈ (0,1); see Figure 1(a).
(b) Negative bias: the probability that the naïve individual acquires the good work habit
from her peers is always lower than if he had copied one role model at random, f(q) < q for
all q ∈ (0,1); see Figure 1(b).
(c) Frequency-dependent bias: when the frequency of the good work habit in the commu-
nity is greater (smaller) than ￿ q, the probability that the naïve individual acquires the good
work habit from her peers is increased (decreased) relative to the unbiased transmission,
f(q) ⋚ q for q ⋚ ￿ q, for some ￿ q ∈ (0,1). “Pure” conformism corresponds to the case when
￿ q = 1/2 since, in that case, when “good” peers constitute less than 50 percent of the popu-
lation, there is a negative bias while a positive bias emerges when “good” peers constitute
more than 50 percent of the population; see Figure 1(c).
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q q q
Figure 1: (a) Positive bias, (b) negative bias, (c) frequency-dependent bias.
Figure 2 displays three frequency-dependent bias transmission functions f(q) that dif-
fer in the strength of the negative bias. The straight 45 degree line describes the oblique
transmission function when it is linear, i.e. f(q) = q. In that case, the probability that
children adopt the good work habit from their peers is exactly equal to the proportion of
good workers in her neighborhood so that the peer transmission is unbiased. By comparing
the dotted line with the thick straight line, one can see that ￿ q is lower in the former than in
the latter. A smaller ￿ q implies that there is an additional bias in favor of the good working
habit.








Figure 2: Diﬀerent frequency-dependent bias transmission functions
10In order to endogeneize the education eﬀort, we need to analyze the employers’ hiring
behavior. We assume that each time an employer meets a bad worker she knows her type
with probability α. With probability 1−α, she (wrongly) believes that the worker is good.13
A good worker is never mistaken for a bad one. Our results are robust to the case of a more
general signal technology, which allows for the mistaken classiﬁcation of good workers as
long as the probability to make a mistake on bad workers is larger that the probability to
make a mistake on good ones. We assume that employers know the actual proportion q of
good agents.
When the worker and the employer are matched, the employer chooses one of the two
following strategies:14
Screening (ρs): Hire only seemingly good workers, i.e. all good workers and some bad ones
who have been (mistakenly) taken for good ones.
Pooling (ρp): Hire nobody.
Employers prefer strategy ρs to ρp if and only if:
qΠg + (1 − q)(1 − α)Πb ≥ 0
We can rewrite this inequality as follows:15
q ≥
−(1 − α)Πb
Πg − (1 − α)Πb
≡ ￿ q (2)
where ￿ q ∈ (0,1). If the proportion of good workers is high enough (q > ￿ q), then screening is
optimal. We denote the optimal strategy by   :
 (q) =
￿
ρs if q ≥ ￿ q
ρp if q < ￿ q
(3)
13The probability α could be group dependent and written as αk, for k = m,M. This extension would
not change any of our results but will unnecessarily complicate the analysis.
14As in a previous version of the paper, we could have assumed that there were two tasks instead of two
types of employment statuses like here. Task 1 is a more complicated and better-paid task while task 2 is a
low-paid task. In that case, in the screening policy, the employer will oﬀer task 1 to seemingly good workers
while in, the pooling strategy, she will oﬀer task 2 to everyone. The results will obviously be the same.
15Remember that Πb < 0.
11Let ρt be the employers’ assignment strategy at time t when meeting a worker. We
assume that a proportion θ ≥ 0 of the employers are taste-based prejudiced and never hire
workers from the minority group, namely ρt = ρp for all t, while a proportion (1 − θ) of
employers follow the optimal strategy, i.e. ρt =  (qt) at each t. The parameter θ, which may
diﬀer across groups, will explain diﬀerences in long-run outcomes. For individuals from the
majority group, θ = 0.
In order to compute the child’s well-being at time t, a parent needs to form expectations
concerning the child’s future job opportunities. We assume that parents prefer their children
to have those preferences which lead to decisions with higher expected income. This assump-
tion departs from previous models in which parents use their own preferences to evaluate
their children decisions (as in Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001, for example). A “job proﬁle”,
from time t + 1 onwards, is an (inﬁnite) sequence {ρz}∞
z=t+1, with ρz ∈ {ρs,ρp}, for all z.
We denote by πt the expectations parents form at time t. We denote by ρs
∞, the inﬁnite
repetition of ρs and by ρp
∞, the inﬁnite repetition of ρs. Let Vi(πt) be the expected earnings
of a worker of type i when the expected job proﬁle is πt.
Note that when unemployed, good and bad workers have zero income. Under the screening
assignment, good workers have higher expected earnings than bad. Let w be the wage when
hired. Denote by λ the probability that an active worker in a given period will still be active












whenever α > 0. Note that for any positive α, good workers have an expected income which
is never smaller than that of bad workers. Then, Vg(πt) ≥ Vb(πt) for any πt.
Let C : [0,1] → R be the cost function when parents choose eﬀort τ, with C(0) =
0,C′(0) = 0, C′(τ) > 0 for all τ > 0, C′′(τ) ≥ 0, and limτ→1 C′(τ) = +∞. For analytical
simplicity, we assume that all parents, irrespective of their type and group, have the same
cost function. This assumption can easily be relaxed without aﬀecting the main results of
the paper.
Given a policy expectation πt, a parent chooses the education eﬀort τ ∈ (0,1] that
maximizes
ptVg (πt) + (1 − pt)Vb (πt) − C(τ) (4)
where pt = τ + (1 − τ)f(qt) (see (1)). Therefore, given the cost C(τ), parents choose τ to
maximize (4). All parents agree that the good trait is better than the bad one and are willing









By substituting (1) in (5), we easily obtain the optimal education eﬀort:
C
′(τ
∗) = ∆V (πt)[1 − f(qt)]
where ∆V (πt) ≡ Vg (πt)−Vb (πt) ≥ 0. This implies that:
τ
∗ = τ (∆V (πt)[1 − f(qt)]) = C
′−1(∆V (πt)[1 − f(qt)]) (6)
When, at time t, everybody in the neighborhood has trait g (i.e., qt = 1) or when it does
not pay to have a good work habit (∆V (πt) = 0), then parents do not put any eﬀort in
transmitting the good trait g and thus τ∗ = 0. On the contrary, if, at time t, nobody in the
neighborhood has good work habits (qt = 0), then parents exert a positive eﬀort to transmit
trait g, provided that ∆V (πt) > 0. Finally, if parents expect that their oﬀsprings will never
be given a job, then it does not pay to have good work habits and τ∗ = 0. Note that the
parents’ decision depends on the society since parents have less incentive to socialize their
children the easier it is for them to learn the good trait from society, namely the larger f(qt).
To summarize, from (6), it is easily veriﬁed that τ∗ increases with ∆V (πt) but decreases
with qt. The latter is referred to as cultural substitution in Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001).
4 Steady-state equilibrium
Following Hauk and Sáez-Martí (2002), we assume a Poisson birth and death process that
keeps the population size of active workers constant. With probability λ an active worker
will be active the next period. With probability 1 −λ an active worker in t has a child who
becomes active in t+1. We are now able to write the dynamics of qt, the proportion of good
workers at time t:
qt+1 = λqt + (1 − λ)qt pt + (1 − λ)(1 − qt) pt
The proportion of good workers at t + 1 is equal to the proportion of good workers who
survived from period t (with probability λ) plus all new-born good children, i.e. the children
born with good parents who adopt good work habits ((1−λ)qt pt) plus the children born with
bad parents who adopt good work habits ((1 − λ)(1 − qt) pt). Observe that the probability
13to adopt good work habits is independent of the parents’ types since all parents value the
“good” trait equally.16 Using (1), we can rewrite this equation as:
∆qt = (1 − λ)[f(qt) − qt] + (1 − λ)τ
∗
t [1 − f(qt)] (7)
where ∆qt ≡ qt+1 − qt and τ∗
t ≡ τ (∆V (πt)(1 − f(qt)), as given by (6). It is easily seen that
∆qt is increasing in τ∗
t for all qt  = 1, which means that the more parents invest in the good
work habit, the higher is the proportion of good parents in the population.
Observe that when ∆V (πt) = 0, τ∗
t = 0 and
∆qt = (1 − λ)[f(qt) − qt]
In that case, there are two stable rest points, at 0 and 1, and an unstable one at q∗ = ￿ q.
Note that if the peer transmission was unbiased, i.e. f(qt) = qt, then any value of q would
be a steady state.
If ∆V (πt) > 0, τ∗
t > 0, then
∆qt > (1 − λ)[f(qt) − qt]
for all qt < 1. In that case, for large enough ∆V (πt), q∗ = 1 is the unique steady state. Oth-
erwise, there were will be two stable steady states, q∗ = 1 and q∗ = q∗(∆V ) ∈ (0, ￿ q), where
q∗(∆V ) is the smallest q such that ∆q = 0. Note also that under unbiased transmission
(f(q) = q), all agents would have good work ethics in the long run and the only stable
steady-state equilibrium would thus be q∗ = 1. Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics of qt, where
the lower curve (solid line) corresponds to ∆V = 0, and the curves above (in dotted lines)
give the dynamics of qt when ∆V increases. Since when the latter increases so does ∆qt,
then for large enough ∆V , ∆qt is non negative for all qt (upper curve).
16This is an important diﬀerence with Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) where each parent values more her
type than the other type.
14qk
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Figure 3: Dynamics of qt.
In order to characterize the steady states of the economy, we need to compute the values
parents attribute to their children. A parent, whose have a child at time t, needs to form
expectations concerning the future employment status of her oﬀspring (i.e. employers’ future
strategies). We denote by πt the expectations parents form at time t.
Assume ﬁrst that parents expect that their children will always be unemployed in the
future, irrespective of their type, i.e. c = ρp
∞. Then, ∆V (ρp
∞) = 0, parents put zero
eﬀort (τ∗ = 0), and consequently there are two stable rest points, at q∗ = 0 and q∗ = 1.
If parents, instead, expect that some employers will employ seemingly good workers, then
πt = (θρp + (1 − θ)ρs)∞, and for θ < 1,17
∆V ((θρ





In that case, q∗ = 1 is always a steady-state equilibrium and, depending on the value of
∆V (πt), there might be an interior stable steady state q∗(∆V ).
17Indeed, Vi((θρp + (1 − θ)ρs)∞) is the utility a parent attributes to her child of type i = g,b when the
expected job proﬁle is θρp + (1 − θ)ρs)∞. Because the duration of time individuals are active is 1/(1 − λ),
then




Vb((θρp + (1 − θ)ρs)∞) =
(1 − θ)(1 − α)w
1 − λ
15Indeed, when parents expect that their children will not beneﬁt from good working habits,
they do not exert any eﬀort in transmitting the good trait, and peers determine the long
run equilibrium. In that case, only q∗ = 0 and q∗ = 1 can be stable steady-state equilibria
depending on the initial “quality” of the neighborhood in terms of work habits. When
parents expect that their children will beneﬁt from good work habits, they exert strictly
positive eﬀort to transmit the good trait and, in steady state, there will be more workers
with good habits than otherwise. This is why a third interior stable steady state q∗(∆V )
may emerge.
The equilibria that will be reached in the long run depend on the initial conditions,
parents’ expectations and ﬁrms’ behaviors. We assume that all-non discriminating employers
maximize proﬁts in each period and that parents have rational expectations.18
Deﬁnition 1 Assume that qt = q∗ and that the proportion of prejudiced employers is θ.
Then, q∗ is a stable steady state under rational expectations and proﬁt maximizing behavior
if and only if:
(i) Firms maximize proﬁt: All non-prejudiced employers choose ρt =  (q∗) for all t > t0,
while the prejudiced employers choose ρt = ρp for all t > t0.
(ii) Rational expectations:





(ii) Stability: ∆q∗ = 0 and at q∗, ∂∆q/∂q < 0.
Let E(θ) be the set of stable steady states under rational expectations when the propor-
tion of prejudices employers is θ. We have:
Proposition 1 Assume that f(q)   q for q   ￿ q for some ￿ q ∈ (0,1). Then,
(i) {0,1} ⊆ E(θ) for all θ.
(ii) q∗(∆V ((θρp + (1 − θ)ρs)∞)) ∈ E(θ) whenever q∗(∆V ((θρp + (1 − θ)ρs)∞)) ≥ ￿ q.
18Deﬁnition 1 and Proposition 1 are valid for both minority and majority workers since the analysis of the
latter is a special case of the former when θ = 0.
16Proof. If parents expect that their children will never be given a job, i.e. πt = ρp
∞, then
∆V (ρp
∞) = 0 and ∆q = (1 − λ)[f(q) − q]. In that case, the only two stable steady-state
equilibria are q∗ = 0 and q∗ = 1.
If parents expect (θρp+(1−θ)ρs)∞, then ∆V > 0. In that case, q∗ = 1 is always a steady-
state equilibrium under rational expectations and so is q∗(∆V ) provided that ￿ q ≤ q∗(∆V ),
since it is in the interest of the non-prejudiced employers to use the screening assignment
and expectations are rational.
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 1 where stable steady states are displayed by squares.
The solid line are the dynamics when parents expect the pooling assignment (ρp
∞) while the
dashed line is when parents’ expectations are: (θρp + (1 − θ)ρs)∞. The interior equilibrium
cannot be sustained when parents expect (ρp
∞) since, in that case, they put not eﬀort, i.e.
τ∗ = 0. As a result, in that case, the dynamics of qt is only driven by peer eﬀects, and,
because of frequency-dependent bias, in steady-state, either everybody end up with bad
work habits or good work habits. It is the initial quality of the neighborhood that decides
the equilibrium value of q∗. When parents expect (θρp+(1−θ)ρs)∞, then everything depends
on θ, the fraction of prejudiced employers. In the upper panel of Figure 4, the fraction θ of
prejudiced employers is high and interior values of q cannot constitute a stable steady-state
equilibrium. In the lower panel, θ has a lower value and therefore a stable interior equilibrium
q∗(∆V ) can be sustained in steady-state.
In this model, the set of steady states under rational expectations, E(θ), is either {0,1}
or {0,q∗(∆V ),1}. When θ, the proportion of discriminating employers is high enough, there
cannot be an equilibrium where the non-prejudiced employers follow the screening assign-
ment. Indeed, if parents expect the non-prejudiced employers to oﬀer their children the
screening contract, the economy would converge to a state where q(θ) < ￿ q, for which the







Figure 4: Stable steady-state equilibria under rational expectations
Observe that, since qt varies over time, the employers’ strategy can switch over time (for
screening to pooling or vice versa). However, because of rational expectations, this switching
strategy has to be “rational” for the ﬁrms, i.e. it has to be that it is proﬁt maximizing for
non-discriminating ﬁrms to switch strategies. Assume, for example, that parents anticipate
that, at time t = 0,1,...,19 up to period T = 20, the non-prejudiced ﬁrms will follow the
screening policy and then from period T = 20 onwards the pooling policy will be optimal
for these ﬁrms. If parents invest on τ according to these (non-stationary) expectations,
the dynamics generated by (7) are such, at time T, the employers optimally change their
policy, namely expectations are rational. The results of Proposition 1 on stable steady-state
equilibria are still valid even if ﬁrms switch their optimal strategy over time.
Let us now interpret our model in terms of two groups, the majority group (i.e. whites)
for which k = M, and the minority group (i.e. blacks) for which k = m. For the majority
group, θ = 0 and therefore depending on parents’ expectations and on initial neighborhood
quality, each of 0, q∗(∆V ) and 1 can be a stable steady-state equilibrium. For the minority
18group, the equilibrium outcome depends on parents’ expectations and initial neighborhood
quality but also on the percentage θ of prejudiced employers. As a result, the two diﬀerent
groups may end-up in very diﬀerent steady states depending on discrimination and diﬀerent
strengths of their peer groups. Figure 5 illustrates how diﬀerent values of θ can lead to very
diﬀerent long-run outcomes for black and white workers. The uppest curve represents the
dynamics for θ = 0, the lowest one for θ = 1, and the middle one for an intermediate value
of θ. It is easy to see that for the same initial conditions, the economy may converge to very
diﬀerent states. For whites, θ = 0, and they end up in steady-state with a large fraction of
them having good work habits (either q∗
M is interior or q∗
M = 1). In other words, there is no
equilibrium in which all whites have bad habits because parents rationally anticipate that
their children will always be given a job. For blacks, θ ≥ 0, and the outcomes depend on the
percentage of discriminating employers θ and the initial condition. If θ = 1 (all employers
discriminate against blacks and never employ them), then if the initial neighborhood has
enough individuals with bad work habits, all black workers will have bad work habits in
equilibrium, i.e. q∗
m = 0. When θ decreases, there is less discrimination against blacks, and
depending on the neighborhood where they live, a more or less large fraction of blacks can
end up having good work habits.
To summarize, when discrimination prevails, it is less likely that blacks have good work
habits, especially if they live in segregated neighborhoods where most of their peers have
also bad work habits. Indeed, if the fraction of prejudiced employers is high enough, their
beliefs are always self-fulﬁlled. In steady-state, the work habit of minority workers is (on
average) bad and the proﬁt maximizing strategy is not to give them jobs. Due to the
worse opportunities their children are going to face, minority parents do not ﬁnd worthwhile
exerting eﬀort to transmit “good” values. As a result, more minority workers have bad work
habits. This, in turn, inﬂuences members of the next generations in the same community
and the initial negative beliefs are conﬁrmed in steady state.
This mechanism could explain why some (inner-city) neighborhoods are populated by
people having bad working habits (the “ghetto culture” mentioned in the Introduction).
This may be the result of a combination of discrimination, low investment in work ethic




Figure 5: Black and white outcomes
In the next section, we study the eﬀect of policies that can break down this vicious cycle of
negative attitudes and behaviors that lead to unemployment and bad working habits among
minority workers.
5 Aﬃrmative Action and integration policies
5.1 Aﬃrmative Action
Let us start by considering an aﬃrmative-action policy that consists in giving a preferential
treatment to discriminated groups, for example, by imposing minimum hiring quotas to
ﬁrms.19
Let us focus on minority workers. Assume that qm = 0 (all workers of the community
are unemployed and have bad work habits) and that all employers (prejudiced and non-
prejudiced) are forced to hire a proportion φ of minority workers (ﬁrst Aﬃrmative Action
policy). This policy will have an eﬀect on the proportion of good workers only if it changes
the parent’s evaluation of the traits. Since employment possibilities are independent of type,
i.e., both types get the same expected wage, then ∆V = 0, and this Aﬃrmative Action
policy will have no eﬀect on parents’ incentives.
Consider now an Aﬃrmative Action policy that requires the screening assignment for a
quota φ of workers (second Aﬃrmative Action policy). In other words, all ﬁrms, including
19For an overview and evaluation on Aﬃrmative Action policies in the United States, see Holzer and
Neumark (2000, 2006).
20the prejudiced ones, are obliged to treat a proportion φ of minority workers the same way
they treat majority workers, namely use with them the screening policy.20 If parents expect





and this policy has the potential to be eﬀective since good workers have a higher probability
of being employed.
Assume now that the ﬁrst policy is introduced when qt = q∗(∆V ) > ￿ q, where ￿ q is deﬁned
in (2). In that case, parents’ evaluation of the trait is:
∆V =
(1 − φ)(1 − θ)αw
(1 − λ)
Note that this value is smaller than ∆V ((θkρp + (1 − θk)ρs)∞) (see (8)) and this policy has
a negative eﬀect since it reduces the equilibrium value of good workers. The second policy,
instead, will have a positive eﬀect because it increases the value of a good child relative to




(1 − θ + φθ)αw
(1 − λ)
> ∆V ((θkρ




Without the Aﬃrmative Action policy, all non-prejudiced employers employ seemingly
good workers and this gives an advantage to the good workers (since bad workers are detected
with positive probability). Under the ﬁrst Aﬃrmative Action policy, the advantage of being
“good” is smaller and, as a result, parents put less eﬀort. If, when the policy is introduced,
the state of the economy is close enough to ￿ q or/and φ is high enough, the economy will
converge to the worst steady state (i.e. q∗
m = 0). Instead, when the second policy is
implemented, a larger share of workers are automatically screened and the return is higher
for good workers.
Our results are related to that of Coate and Loury (1993). In their paper, Aﬃrmative
Action is modeled as a government-mandated constraint on employers, requiring them to
20The main diﬀerence between these two Aﬃrmative Action policies is that, in the ﬁrst one, employers are
obliged to hire φ% of their workers from the minority group but cannot test them. So whether the worker
is “good” or “bad” is irrelevant in the employment process and “good” and “bad” workers have the same
chance to be hired. In the second Aﬃrmative Action policy, employers are still obliged to hire φ% of their
workers from the minority group but can test them. As a result, only “good” workers and seemingly “good”
workers with bad work habits will be hired.
21assign workers from each group to more rewarding jobs at the same rate. Aﬃrmative action
may sometimes fail because employers, to comply with the Aﬃrmative-Action policy, must
lower their standard for assigning the workers, for whom they have negative views about,
to good jobs. Lowering the standard may reduce investment incentives because the favored
workers see themselves as likely to succeed without acquiring the relevant skills. Thus em-
ployers’ negative stereotypes can continued to be conﬁrmed in equilibrium under Aﬃrmative
Action. Coate and Loury show that this equilibrium is more likely to exist if the proportion
of these workers is relatively rare in the population. Even if the mechanism is diﬀerent, this
result is close to ours when the ﬁrst Aﬃrmative Action policy is implemented. In our case,
compared to the equilibrium without aﬃrmative action, parents put relatively less eﬀort
in transmitting the good trait because a fraction of workers, irrespective of their type, are
sure to be employed. Our conclusion is that only the second policy should be implemented
because it gives the right incentives to parents to transmit good working habits to their
children.
5.2 Integration
Racial integration is a very sensitive and highly debated policy in the United States.21 Pro-
grams like, for example, the Moving to Opportunity” (MTO) program aims at moving very
poor households to richer areas.22 Our model can shed some light on this controversial
debate.
Assume now that workers from diﬀerent groups interact with each other and let σk denote
21For instance, in 1974, federal judge W. Arthur Garrity ordered to integrate Boston’s schools through
forced busing (black kids were driven by bus to white schools). Twenty ﬁve years after, in june 1999, facing
pressure from a lawsuit by white parents and advocates of neighborhood schools, the city’s school board
voted 5-2 to stop the busing policy and to adopt a race-blind admissions policy starting in September 2000
(Education Week, 08/04/99 edition, by Caroline Hendrie).
22By giving housing assistance (i.e. vouchers and certiﬁcates) to low-income families, the MTO programs
help them to relocate to better and richer neighborhoods. The results of most MTO programs (in particular
for Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York) show a clear improvement of the well-being
of participants and better labor market outcomes (see, in particular, Ladd and Ludwig, 2001, Katz et al.,
2001, Kling et al., 2005, Rosenbaum and Harris, 2001). Observe that the MTO programs are not targeted
on minority families (such as blacks) by rather on poor families. But since the two are correlated, this is a
good example of an integration policy.
22the proportion of individuals of the other group among the peers.23 Now the dynamics of
group k = m,M are given by:
∆q
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The eﬀect of mixing families is to increase the proportion of good workers in the popu-
lation that has a lower proportion of them (say blacks), and to decrease its proportion in
the other population (say whites). In other words, if white families have better work habits,
then blacks will beneﬁt from this policy since it will increase the percentage of black people
with good work habits in the neighborhood but whites will suﬀer from it since they will be
more expose to families with bad work habits. This result could explain why the diﬀerent
integration policies implemented in the US and in Europe24 seem to have small eﬀects be-
cause of the possible negative eﬀect on the white population. Indeed, mixing policies, which
include school busing, forced integration of public housing, and laws barring discrimination
in housing and employment,25 have often had limited eﬀects and are even being at times
opposed by the majority groups in whose interest they have been pursued (see e.g., Jacoby,
1998, and Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 2002).
Interestingly, Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008), who incorporate neighborhood eﬀects into
an otherwise standard statistical discrimination model, ﬁnd a similar result, even though
the mechanism is totally diﬀerent. In their paper, increasing integration tends to lower the
costs of human acquisition for B-workers while raising these costs for A-workers. Thus,
if integration proceeds far enough, the authors show that negative stereotypes cannot be
sustained.
23In our framework, intermediate value of σk mean that blacks and whites live together. For example,
in 1979, the average black lived in a neighborhood that was 63.6% black, even though blacks formed only
14.9% of the population (Borjas, 1998, Table 1). This means here that σm = 0.364.
24For instance, the creations of Zones of Educational Priority (ZEP) and the rehabilitation of bleak housing
projects in immigrant neighborhoods under the guise of urban policy (‘politique de la ville’) in France had
very limited eﬀects. See, for example, Benabou et al. (2009) for an evaluation of the ZEP and Brubaker
(2001) who compares the diﬀerent ways of assimilating ethnic minorities in France, Germany, and the US.
25See Lang (2007) for an overview of these policies in the U.S.
23Guryan (2004) shows that the desegregation plans that have been implemented in Amer-
ican schools for the last forty years, have mainly beneﬁted the black students by reducing
their high school drop out rates while they had no eﬀect on the dropout rates of the other
students. Peer eﬀects are shown to be one of the main explanations of this result. Studying
the Metco program, a long-running desegregation program that sends mostly Black students
out of the Boston public school district to attend schools in more aﬄuent suburban districts,
Angrist and Lang (2004) ﬁnd similar results.26
6 Concluding remarks
We have introduced a dynamic model of cultural transmission to explain diﬀerent outcomes
for minority and majority workers. We have shown that if the proportion of taste-based
prejudiced employers is high enough, prejudices can be conﬁrmed in equilibrium. Otherwise,
multiple equilibria exist, with and without discrimination. We have also studied diﬀerent
policies aiming at reducing discrimination. Both Aﬃrmative Action27 and integration policies
may work. The mechanisms through which these two policies aﬀect the quality of the
workers are diﬀerent, though. Aﬃrmative action policies directly aﬀect the expected payoﬀ
of the diﬀerent types of workers and the parents’ incentives to invest on those traits. By
“improving” the quality of the peers black children interact with, integration policy has a
positive eﬀect on those workers with worse peer group. The opposite happens for the other
children since, after integration, they interact with a “worse” quality peer group. From a
political economy perspective, it is likely that all workers will support the Aﬃrmative Action
policy while only families from bad neighborhoods may favor the integration policy. As far
as employers are concerned, it seems plausible that they may object to Aﬃrmative Action
policies that impose too small quotas. The reason for this opposition is that they are forced
to oﬀer contracts that are suboptimal given the average composition of workers. When the
Aﬃrmative Action quotas are high enough, both employers and workers beneﬁt from the
policy.
26There is also a growing literature in the ﬁelds of public ﬁnance, development and urban economics that
shows that investments in public goods, tastes for redistribution, and other forms of civic behavior are less
common in racially or ethnically diverse communities (see, in particular, Alesina et al., 1999, Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2000, Luttmer, 2001, Vigdor, 2004).
27In this discussion, we only focus on the second Aﬃrmative Action policy.
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